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America’s Real ‘Debt Dilemma’1 
 
SANDY BRIAN HAGER 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of the current crisis there has been an explosive rise in the level of the 
US public debt. These massive levels of public indebtedness are expected to keep 
growing unless there are drastic changes to existing budgetary policies. According 
to a recent series in the Financial Times, the US now faces a ‘debt dilemma’ over 
whether the country should bring its fiscal house in order through tax hikes on the 
rich or cuts to entitlement programs. This apparent dilemma has sparked a debate 
over which groups should bear the burden of debt repayment and fiscal adjustment. 
However, one crucial question remains unasked: whose powerful interests are 
served by the public debt? Mapping the share of federal bonds holdings of and 
interest to the top 1%, my research uncovers a staggering trend towards 
concentration over the past three decades and shows that federal income taxes and 
transfer payments have done little to offset this regressive distribution. Increases to 
the public debt without progressive redistributive policies are likely to aggravate an 
already explosive situation characterized by inequality, while decreases to the 
privately held portion of the public debt are likely to encounter resistance from the 
top 1%. This is America’s real debt dilemma.   
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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Policy Studies Conference: Policy 
Research in Times of Austerity and Uncertainty at Ryerson University, Toronto, 8–10 May 
2013. I would like to thank the conference participants, and especially Chris Faricy, Bryan 
Evans and Stephen McBride for their insightful feedback and questions. I would like to 
thank Joseph Baines, Tim Di Muzio, Jeremy Green, Jeffrey Harrod, Jonathan Nitzan and Mark 
Peacock for help on earlier drafts of this paper. Funding from the SSHRC Joseph-Armand 
Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship and the Ontario Graduate Scholarship are 
gratefully acknowledged. I am responsible for any remaining errors or shortcomings.  
AMERICA’S REAL ‘DEBT DILEMMA’  
42 
 
‘Every man and woman who owned a Government Bond, we believed, would serve as a 
bulwark against the constant threats to Uncle Sam’s pocketbook from pressure blocs 
and special-interest groups. In short, we wanted the ownership of America to be in the 
hands of the American people’ 
-Henry Morgenthau Jr.2 
 
n the wake of the current financial crisis the debt of the US federal government 
has increased from 64 percent of GDP in 2007 to 103 percent in 2012. And due 
to soaring costs associated with an ageing population, some expect the federal 
debt to balloon further without drastic changes to existing budget policies. 
According to a recent series in the Financial Times, America now finds itself in the 
middle of a ‘debt dilemma’ over what policies it should pursue to bring its fiscal 
house into order (Harding 2013).  
 
As the recent political gridlock over the debt ceiling, the fiscal cliff and sequestration 
demonstrate, there has been little consensus over how to resolve this supposed 
‘debt dilemma’. The positions within the debate are diverse but generally fall 
between two poles of thought.  
 
On the one side, there are those, including the corporate-led ‘Fix the Debt’ campaign, 
which argue that the US should reduce its public debt immediately, lest the 
government find itself in a Greek-style bankruptcy (Cote 2012; Ferguson 2009, 
2010). The preferred method for reducing the debt is austerity that will cut 
spending to America’s ‘bloated’ social programs (Kotlikoff 2010).  
 
On the other side, there are those, including the ‘Flip the Debt’ campaign associated 
with the Occupy movement, which urge caution and argue that the public debt has 
been a necessary component of the federal government’s crisis-management 
policies (Krugman 2012a; Wolf 2013; Summers 2013). With stubbornly high 
unemployment and increasing income and wealth inequality, the preferred method 
of gradually reducing the debt is tax hikes on the ‘super-rich’ that have gained the 
most from the political economic regime in place since the early 1980s (Buffett 
2011, 2012; Sachs 2012).   
 
Thanks to the efforts of the ‘Flip the Debt’ and other progressive movements, issues 
of power and inequality have been forced into the current debate over the ‘debt 
dilemma’. Their slogan – ‘Hey 1%! Pay your damn taxes!’ – places the responsibility 
                                                        
2 Cited in Tufano and Schneider (2005, p. 11). 
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for debt reduction squarely on the shoulders of the large corporations and the top 
1% that have ‘stolen’ an estimated $2.3 trillion using tax loopholes, offshore tax 
havens and tax cuts. ‘Flip the Debt’ sees the explosive increase in the public debt as 
an outcome of growing inequality and calls on those at the top of this increasingly 
unequal society to pay their ‘fair share’ to help reduce it. 
 
Yet what is most interesting about this often-vicious debate is not the questions that 
get answered, but the ones that are overlooked. One such question is why must the 
public debt be repaid? Whether mainstream or critical, all participants in this debate 
assume that, sooner or later, either through spending cuts or tax hikes, the public 
debt will have to be reduced from its current levels. The refusal even to contemplate 
alternatives to debt reduction points to the unquestioned sanctity of 
creditworthiness and ‘sound finance’ within contemporary capitalist society 
(Graeber 2011, p. 3).3  
 
Most importantly, the current debate also overlooks the question of whose interests 
are served by the public debt. What if questions of power are not only central to the 
issue of public debt repayment, but also to the very existence of the public debt in 
the first place? What if the public debt is not simply an outcome of inequality but 
also part of its cause? What if the top 1% is the major ‘winner’ of the recent public 
debt explosion, dominating the ownership of federal bonds and the interest paid on 
them? How would our understanding of the ‘debt dilemma’ change if we started to 
ask these questions?  
 
My purpose in this article is to go beyond the current debate over America’s ‘debt 
dilemma’ and explore these questions. To this end, I present long-term historical 
research that empirically maps the share of the public debt owned by the top 1% of 
US households. This research demonstrates that, over the past century, inequality in 
the ownership of federal bonds and in the interest that is paid on them runs closely 
to the U-shaped pattern that characterizes the overall distribution of wealth and 
income. Over the past three decades, and especially in the context of the current 
crisis, the top 1% share of federal debt and interest has increased at a stunning rate 
and is now approaching the historic highs of the 1920s. This concentrated pattern of 
                                                        
3 By accepting the ‘sound finance’ doctrine, even progressive voices often fall into the trap of 
thinking about the government budget as if it were the budget of a household or a 
corporation. Yet as proponents of Post Keynesian Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) explain, 
a monetarily sovereign (i.e. fiat currency-issuing) entity like the US federal government is 
never revenue constrained like a household or corporation and technically can never go 
bankrupt (see Wray 2012). This simple observation suggests that there are no inherent 
limits on government borrowing. These limits must necessarily be political.  
AMERICA’S REAL ‘DEBT DILEMMA’  
44 
 
ownership suggests that since the early 1980s the public debt has come to serve 
more and more as an institution of power that works in the interests of the top 1%.  
 
I then go on to explore two potential counter-arguments that downplay the 
significance of this increasingly concentrated pattern of public debt ownership. The 
first concerns the role of federal income taxation in progressively redistributing the 
concentrated federal interest income received by the top 1%. According to this 
counter-argument, the rich do indeed receive the bulk of federal interest income, 
but they also pay the bulk of federal income taxes (Eisner 1986). Thus the 
progressive system of federal taxation is said to neutralize the regressive 
distribution of federal interest income. My research, however, suggests that this 
argument is completely misleading. Though federal income taxes remain marginally 
progressive it has done little to offset the increasingly regressive distribution of 
federal interest income.  
 
The second potential counter-argument has to do with the role of intra-
governmental debt, the portion of the public debt held by the federal government, in 
offsetting the regressive pattern of privately held public debt. Intra-governmental 
debt, which stood at $4.6 trillion or 31 percent of GDP in 2011, represents the 
accumulated surpluses in government trust fund accounts such as social security 
and Medicare. These intra-governmental holdings have been celebrated by 
Keynesians as a progressive redistributive force working in the interests of middle 
class Americans (Cavanaugh 1996; Heilbroner and Bernstein 1989). The 
outstanding level of intra-governmental debt tells us nothing about the social 
interests that are served by it. But technically speaking, when the federal 
government spends via transfer payments it cashes in some of the Treasury 
securities held in its trust fund accounts. It is therefore possible to examine the 
distribution of transfer payments to indirectly measure the interests served by 
intra-governmental debt.  
 
Analyzing Congressional Budget Office data on the distribution of transfer payments 
since 1979, my research indicates that the top 1% has never received a significant 
amount of government transfer payments and that its share has actually fallen 
during the current crisis. Yet this is no reason to celebrate intra-governmental debt 
as a progressive force. Once we start to dig deeper and dissect the distribution of 
transfer payments within the bottom 99% – a diverse category with its own social 
hierarchy – it is clear that over the past three decades intra-government debt has, if 
anything, intensified social inequality and polarization.  
 
AMERICA’S REAL ‘DEBT DILEMMA’  
45 
 
Overall, my research indicates that the public debt has, especially over the past 
three decades or so, served as an institution that directly augments and reinforces 
the power of those at the very top of the social hierarchy. America does indeed have 
a ‘debt dilemma’, but that this dilemma is of a very different nature than that 
suggested within the current debate.  
 
On the one hand, when it comes to possible debt reduction, the top 1% is likely to 
resist any attempts to cut the privately held portion of the public debt that they have 
come to dominate. This is especially the case in the context of the current crisis in 
which ‘risk-free’ federal bonds have provided a modicum of security in financial 
markets plagued by ‘systemic fear’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2011). Debt reduction is 
therefore likely to target the intra-governmental portion of the public debt, which, 
although increasingly regressive, is still broadly an institution that works in favour 
of the bottom 99%. On the other hand, further increases to the public debt are likely, 
given the state of wealth and income inequality in US, to be purchased by the top 
1%. Adding to the outstanding public debt is therefore liable to further skew the 
concentration of federal bond ownership and the federal interest that is paid on 
them.   
 
Without progressive redistributive spending and/or tax policies, both of these 
actions are liable to aggravate an already explosive situation characterized by 
deepening inequality. This is America’s real debt dilemma.  
 
In developing these arguments, the rest of this article will be organized as follows. 
The first section sketches an alternative power-centered class framework that maps 
the distribution of federal bonds and federal interest held by the top 1%. The next 
two sections engage empirically with the two potential counter arguments 
mentioned above. A concluding section then fleshes out my arguments about 
America’s real debt dilemma.  
 
Public Debt and the Distribution of Power 
In an interview with Tim Di Muzio in the Review of Capital as Power, Shimshon 
Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan (2012) offer some ideas on how the division between 
the top 1% and the bottom 99% can be employed for more than catchy sloganeering 
and serve as the foundation for theoretical-empirical explorations of capitalist 
power. Bichler and Nitzan (ibid, p. 5) suggest that a novel understanding of the 
power of the top 1% must be driven by new methods and accounting techniques 
that map the quantitative manifestation of this power: namely, the ‘differential 
income streams and asset holdings’ of the top 1%. A focus on the wealth and income 
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shares of the top 1%, they caution, cannot tell us everything about the capitalist 
ruling class, but it does constitute an ‘indirect proxy’ for the power of the dominant 
capital groups at the center of accumulation (ibid, p. 5).  
 
So if we want to move beyond the current debate over the ‘debt dilemma’ and look 
at the power underpinnings of the public debt, then an examination of the top 
percentile’s share of federal bonds and interest income is a good place to 
start. Figure 1 traces my efforts to map the long-term historical share of the public 
debt owned by the top 1% of US households (ranked by net worth).  
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Figure 1 The Top 1% Share of Federal Bonds and Net Wealth 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent observations. The 
dots in the thick series denote the years for which data is available. 
 
Source: For public debt, Lampman (1962) for 1922-1961; the Federal Reserve's Survey 
of Consumer Finances for 1962-1968, 1970-2010; the IRS's Personal Wealth Report for 
the 1% share of the public debt in 1969: 
(http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/69inpwar.pdf). 
Smith (1974) for individual ownership of the public debt in 1969.  
For net wealth, Wolff (1996, 2010) cited in Domhoff (2012). 
The observation for 2010 is based on my own calculation from the Federal Reserve's 
2010 Survey of Consumer Finance.  
 
Top 1% Share of Wealth 
Top 1% Share of Federal Bonds 
percent percent 
sbhager.tumblr.com 
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The figure comprises two series: the thick dotted series measures the top 1% share 
of federal bonds while the thin series measures its share of wealth in general.4 Both 
series follow the same general pattern. During the 1920s, the top percentile’s share 
of the public debt and wealth were both over 40%. Over the next half-century both 
of these shares fell gradually before beginning an upward ascent around the 1970s.5 
By 2010, while the top 1% share of wealth had tapered off and declined slightly, the 
share of the public debt owned by the top 1% breached the 40% mark for the first 
time since the 1920s.  
 
Figure 2 maps the distribution of federal interest income that flows from the 
ownership of federal bonds. This figure also comprises two series: the thin dotted 
series measures the share of federal interest income received by the top 1%, while 
the thick series measures its share of general or total income. Once again we see that 
both series follow the same long-term U-shaped pattern, with high concentration in 
the 1920s and 1930s gradually giving way to more equitable distribution through 
the post-World War II period. Over the past three decades or so, the top percentile’s 
shares of both federal interest and general income have increased rapidly, returning 
recently to the historic highs of the pre-WWII era.  
 
Researchers of the US experience have raised concerns over the increasingly ‘top 
heavy’ distribution of wealth and income since the early 1980s (Wolff 1996; Piketty 
and Saez 2003; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010). As Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate, the 
public debt is invariably bound up with this increasingly ‘top heavy’ pattern of 
distribution.  
 
Over the past three decades, and especially in light of the current crisis and the most 
recent public debt explosion, the top 1% has rapidly increased its shares of federal 
bonds and federal interest income. If we take the distribution of ownership and 
income as the ‘quantitative manifestation’ of power, then the conclusion we draw 
from this empirical research is clear: the public debt is an institution of power that 
increasingly works in the interests of the top 1%.  
 
                                                        
4 Figure 1 splices together data from two sources: the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances and the Internal Revenue Service’s Estate Tax Database. Though there 
are important differences in the design and purpose of these two data sets, statisticians 
have suggested that they ‘compare quite favourably’ and can be treated ‘as complimentary 
sources on both wealth and income’ (Johnson and Moore 2005, pp. 87–96).  
5 My imprecise use of language here is intentional. I use words like ‘around’ and ‘or so’ in 
reference to these data because of missing observations (see the notes for Figure 1). In 
particular the 1970s present an empirical blind spot, as no data is available for this decade.  
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Taxation and Redistribution 
Not so fast, skeptics will undoubtedly proclaim. Sure, the rich own most of the public 
debt, but they also pay most of the taxes (see Eisner 1986, p. 42). Thanks to the 
progressive nature of the US federal income tax system, the vast sums of federal 
interest that federal government pays to the top 1% in the form of interest simply 
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Figure 2 The Top 1% Share of Income and Federal Interest Income 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated linearlly by connecting adjacent observations. The 
dots in the thick series denote the years for which data is available. From 1922-1961, 
the top 1% share of federal interest is assumed to be equal to the top 1% share of the 
public debt. From 1962-2010, interest payments for both the top 1% and all debt 
holders are imputed by multiplying the dollar value of different types of Treasury 
securities held by the group (savings bonds, ‘other’ federal others and ‘bond funds’) by 
their corresponding year-end interest rate, and then adding the sum of these products. 
 
Source: For ownership of the public debt, see Figure 1. For interest rates, the US 
Treasury's Monthly Statement of the Public Debt reports: 
(http:/www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm). For the top 1% 
share of income, The World Top Incomes Database:  
(http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/). 
 
Top 1% Share of Income 
(left) 
Top 1% Share of Federal Interest 
(right) 
percent percent 
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flow back to the federal government in the form of income taxes levied on the top 
1%.  
 
The problem with this argument, however, is that it is confidently asserted without 
ever being subjected to systematic historical and empirical scrutiny. In order to 
explore the validity of this argument, we need to somehow measure the effects of 
the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal interest income. An 
effective way of doing this is to estimate and compare the share of the top 1% in 
gross (before-tax) federal interest payments to this group’s share in net (after-tax) 
share federal interest payments (Piketty and Saez 2007, p. 5). This empirical 
technique gives us a sense of the role that the federal income tax system plays in 
redistributing the interest income received by the top 1%.6  
 
A progressive federal income tax system will make the net interest share of the top 
1% smaller than its gross interest share (the difference between the gross and net 
shares will be positive). A regressive federal income tax system will make the net 
interest share of the top 1% greater than its gross share (the difference between the 
gross and net shares will be negative). A neutral federal income tax system will keep 
the gross and net interest share of the top 1% the same. In other words, the more 
progressive the tax system, the greater the gap will be between the gross and net 
share of federal interest received by the top 1% (and vice versa).  
 
Figure 3 adopts this empirical technique to measure the effects of the federal tax 
system on the distribution of federal interest income. The top two series measure 
the gross and net share of federal interest received by the top 1%, while the bottom 
series is a ratio of the gross and net shares. The closer the ratio is to 1, the less 
substantial the impact of the federal income tax system on the distribution of federal 
interest income. Fluctuations in the ratio at the bottom of Figure 3 give us an 
indication of the changing effects of the federal income tax system on the 
distribution of federal interest income: when the ratio is rising/falling, the tax 
system becomes more/less progressive. 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 The net share of the top 1% in federal interest is calculated as follows: 
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According to the ratio series in Figure 3, the effect of the federal income tax system 
on the distribution of federal interest income has fluctuated historically. Over the 
long term, however, the effect of federal income tax on the distribution of federal 
interest income has been fairly constant. The gap between the gross and net series 
has gradually widened over the past five decades, but only very slightly. Meanwhile 
the distribution of federal interest has become rapidly concentrated in favour of the 
top 1%. 
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Figure 3 Giving and Receiving: Gross versus Net Federal Interest Income 
 
Note: Missing data are interpolated from the trend growth rate. The net share of 
interest is calculated by multiplying the top 1% share of total gross interest by 
the differential complements of the income tax rate (see footnote 5).  
 
Source: For the top 1% share of federal interest, see Figure 2. For the effective tax 
rate from 1962-2004, Piketty and Saez (2007):  
(http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/).  
From 2005-2009, the IRS Statistics of Income:  
(http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inwinbulratesshare.pdf).  
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In short, Figure 3 indicates that the federal income tax system has done little to 
offset the growing inequity in the distribution of federal interest payments. What 
the top 1% gives to the federal government in income taxes as a percentage of its 
income has, at least since the early 1980s, failed to keep pace with what it receives 
in federal interest payments. As a result, it is, to put it mildly, highly misleading to 
claim that a progressive federal income tax system offsets the increasingly 
regressive distribution of federal interest income.  
 
Transfer Payments: The Great Equalizer? 
There is still one more argument that skeptics could invoke to downplay the 
regressive distribution of federal bonds and federal interest. This argument has to 
do with the role of intra-governmental debt, the portion of the public debt held by 
the federal government, in offsetting the regressive pattern of privately held public 
debt.  
 
Intra-governmental debt is a peculiar outcome of the government budget 
accounting process, representing the accumulated surpluses in the federal 
government trust fund accounts. Unlike general government revenues and expenses 
where there is no one-to-one correspondence between revenues and the expenses 
they fund, government trust funds are budget accounting devices that ‘earmark’ 
certain types of taxes to corresponding expenditures (see Wray 2004).  
 
For example, federal payroll taxes are earmarked specifically for the Social Security 
Trust Fund account. When payroll taxes exceed social security benefits, the Social 
Security Trust Fund account accumulates a surplus, which the federal government is 
required by law to invest in special interest-bearing Treasury securities. Intra-
governmental holdings of the public debt are significant. In 2012, they stood at $4.8 
trillion, equivalent to nearly half the $11 trillion of the public debt held by private 
investors. 
 
Keynesians celebrate the holdings of the public debt in federal government trust 
fund accounts such as Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid as a progressive force 
that serves the interests of ‘average’ Americans (Cavanaugh 1996, p. 68), while 
neoliberals vilify intra-governmental debt, claiming that it represents the ‘bloated’ 
entitlements of an unsustainable welfare state (Pakko 2009, p. 9). Despite 
fundamental disagreements, both Keynesians and neoliberals accept the notion that 
intra-governmental holdings work to offset the ‘top heavy’ distribution of the 
privately held portion of the public debt.  
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Once again, the problem is that these claims are rarely subjected to historical and 
empirical scrutiny. How, then, do we go about exploring empirically the assertion 
that these substantial intra-governmental holdings somehow represent the interests 
of ‘average’ Americans and offset the regressive distribution of privately held public 
debt?  
 
In and of itself, the overall level of intra-governmental debt tells us nothing about 
the interests that are served by it. But technically when the federal government pays 
out social security benefits and other forms of transfer payments, it cashes in some 
of the Treasury securities from its trust fund accounts to pay out transfer payments 
to individuals and families in dollars and cents. We can therefore examine the 
distribution of transfer payments in order to determine indirectly whose interests 
are served by intra-governmental holdings of the public debt.  
 
A recent study by the Congressional Budget Office (2012) on household income 
inequality offers insights into the distribution of government transfer payments 
over the past three decades. The CBO data indicate that the share of transfer 
payments received by the top 1% of households has changed little over the past 
three decades. Since 1979, the top 1% has received on average a paltry 0.89 per cent 
of transfer payments, and this share fell even further to 0.68 per cent in 2009. As a 
result, there is really no question that over the past three decades intra-
governmental debt has been an institution that serves the interests of the bottom 
99%. 
 
But the fact that the bulk of transfer payments flow to the bottom 99% of 
households should not lead us to overstate the role of intra-governmental debt as a 
progressive redistributive force. The reason for this can be seen once we start to 
break down the distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99%. 
 
Though the 99% has in recent years become a catchall category used to distinguish 
the majority from the wealthy elite, it is, in reality, a very diverse group with its own 
hierarchical structure. The bottom 99% includes social groups ranging from the 
‘power belt’ of professionals in the 90th to 99th percentiles of income distribution 
that ‘surrounds, serves and protects’ the top 1% (Bichler et al. 2012, p. 5), all the 
way down to the 46 million Americans that live below the poverty line (Denavas-
Walt et al. 2012, p. 13). Once we take into account the hierarchical structure within 
the bottom 99% into our analysis of the distribution of transfer payments, we see 
that sweeping transformations have taken place over the past three decades. 
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Figure 4 breaks down the CBO data on the distribution of transfer payments within 
the bottom 99% of households. The figure is divided into two broad categories: the 
thin line shows the share of transfer payments received by households in the 60th 
to the 99th percentiles of income distribution (that is, the top 40% minus the top 
1%), while the thick line shows the share of transfer payments received by 
households in the bottom 40%.  
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Figure 4 Transfer Payments and the Bottom 99% 
 
Note: Transfers include federal, state and local government cash (e.g. social 
security) payments and in-kind (e.g. voucher) payments.  
 
Source: The Congressional Budget Office (2012):  
(http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43373). 
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The CBO data indicates that the share of government transfer payments received by 
the upper stratum of US households has increased modestly over the past three 
decades from 15% in 1979 to 20% in 2009. Meanwhile, households in the bottom 
40% saw their share of transfer payments fall from 73% to 63% over the same 
period. The fall has been particularly dramatic for households that are most likely to 
rely on government transfers for survival, with the share of transfer payments 
received by households in the bottom 20% falling markedly from 54 to 40% from 
1979 to 2009. 
 
Intra-governmental debt, like the income tax system, plays a limited role in 
offsetting ‘top heavy’ distribution of the privately held public debt. Undoubtedly the 
top 1% of households has never claimed much of a stake in the transfer payments 
that flow from the inter-government debt held in government trust fund accounts. 
And thus in broad terms, intra-governmental debt does indeed represent the 
interests of the bottom 99%. Yet once we dig deeper and break down the 
distribution of transfer payments within the bottom 99%, we see that over the past 
three decades intra-governmental debt has intensified social inequality and 
polarization. 
 
Conclusion: The Real Debt Dilemma 
The current debate over the ‘debt dilemma’ draws linkages between the growing 
public debt and issues of distribution and inequality. Those who advocate spending 
cuts blame the public debt explosion on the bottom 99%; a group that they argue 
receives too much from the federal government.7 Meanwhile those who advocate 
tax hikes and the closing of tax loopholes, blame the public debt explosion on the top 
1% that has failed to pay its ‘fair share’ to government coffers.  
 
Using power-centered accounting techniques and methods, the empirical analysis 
presented in this article suggests that the current debate is missing a big part of the 
overall picture. The public debt is not, as the current debate would have us believe, 
simply an outcome of inequality. Rather the public debt, through the power 
dynamics of ownership distribution, directly contributes to income and wealth 
inequality in America. Much like its share of total wealth and income, the top 1% has 
                                                        
7 During the 2012 Presidential election campaign, Republican candidate Mitt Romney 
adopted a similar line of argument, focusing specifically on the bottom 47% of Americans 
who he argued ‘…are dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims, who 
believe the government has a responsibility to care for them, who believe that they are 
entitled to health care, to food, to housing, to you name it. These are people who pay no 
income tax’ (quoted in Rucker 2012).  
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greatly increased its share of federal bonds and federal interest over the past three 
decades or so. Over this period, and especially in the context of the current crisis, 
the public debt has served more and more to augment and reinforce the power of 
the top 1%.  
 
Once these power relations underpinning public indebtedness are brought to the 
fore, we gain a totally different understanding of America’s ‘debt dilemma’.  
 
On the one hand, the federal government faces a dilemma in trying to reduce the 
public debt. Attempts to reduce the privately held portion of the public debt are 
likely to encounter resistance from the top 1%. During the current crisis, federal 
bonds have served as a ‘safe haven’ for investors, and as we saw in Figure 1, the top 
1% has greatly increased its ownership share in the past few years. Without any 
signs of recovery, the top 1% is unlikely to want to relinquish these ‘risk-free’ assets. 
Efforts to reduce the debt are therefore likely to target the intra-governmental debt, 
which, although increasingly regressive, still works broadly in the interests of the 
bottom 99%. Reducing intra-governmental debt held in government trust fund 
accounts is tantamount to gutting social programs. Given the state of wealth and 
income inequality in America, it is worth questioning whether an austerity drive of 
this type can occur without causing major social upheaval.  
 
On the other hand, the federal government faces a dilemma in trying to increase the 
public debt. Again taking into consideration the current state of wealth and income 
inequality, any further increases to the privately held portion of the public debt are 
likely to be purchased by the top 1%. Adding to the outstanding public debt is 
therefore likely to further skew the concentration of federal bonds and federal 
interest and contribute directly to growing income and wealth inequality. And this 
potential dynamic brings with it its own questions about whether any policy actions 
that further increase wealth and income inequality can be implemented without 
encountering further resistance from the bottom 99%.  
 
Without progressive redistributive spending and/or tax policies, actions to decrease 
and increase the public debt are both liable to aggravate an already explosive 
situation characterized by deepening social inequality. This is America’s real debt 
dilemma. And this dilemma only makes sense once we investigate the power 
relations that underpin the public debt.  
 
For some, these conclusions may seem somewhat counter-intuitive if not completely 
contradictory: isn’t the ruling class adverse to big government and public debt? How 
can the public debt serve as an institution of power when the most powerful seem 
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so opposed to it? Just look at the high profile ‘Fix the Debt’ campaign that is led by 
billionaire fiscal conservative Pete Peterson and supported by CEOs from dominant 
corporations such as Bank of America, Boeing, Citigroup, General Electric, Goldman 
Sachs, Honeywell, Microsoft, Time Warner and Verizon (see Confessore 2013).8  
‘Fix the Debt’ does indeed advocate debt reduction. But the ‘fix’ that the campaign 
prescribes focuses almost solely on cuts to social security, Medicare and Medicaid 
programs, along with a ‘pro-growth’ tax regime that would introduce unspecified 
measures to broaden the tax revenue base and at the same time reduce tax rates 
(Krugman 2012). Fear mongering about the public debt and budget deficits is just a 
means for ‘Fix the Debt’ to push through an austerity agenda, one that, in the words 
of a recent editorial in The Nation (2013), is bent on ‘…making the 99% pay to make 
the wealthiest 1% a whole lot wealthier’.  
 
To understand how the ruling class really views debt reduction, we can look back at 
a rare but recent instance in US history when there was a serious prospect for public 
debt elimination. During the second administration of Bill Clinton the federal 
government ran budget surpluses and significantly reduced the public debt. And by 
the turn of the millennium, many were forecasting that the public debt would soon 
be eliminated altogether.  
 
Of course these forecasts now appear farcical with the public debt nearing 100 
percent of GDP. But what is interesting is the lukewarm response to the prospect of 
debt elimination from powerful financial interests. Rather than celebrate the 
Clinton-era surpluses, financial groups started to worry about the implications of 
the rapid disappearance of federal bonds, which provide not only a massive and 
liquid financial market, but which are also the benchmark asset used to price all 
other types of assets (Reiner 2001). And in a telling 2001 speech to the Bond Market 
Association, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spent a great deal of effort 
trying to justify budget surpluses by placating fears about the negative effects of 
debt retirement on financial markets.9 If the ruling class response to debt reduction 
                                                        
8 A recent study by Page, Bartels and Seawright (2013: 55–6) lends credence to this view. In 
their survey, these researchers surveyed a sample of wealth individuals within the top 1% 
and asked them to identify ‘very important problems’ currently faced by the US. 87 percent 
of the individuals sampled identified ‘budget deficits’ as one of these problems. In fact, the 
top 1% cited budget as a ‘very important problem’ more than any other issue, including 
unemployment (84 percent), education (79 percent) and international terrorism (74 
percent). In contrast, a survey of general public opinion by CBS found that only 7 percent of 
people identified budget deficits and public debt as the most important problem facing the 
country.  
9 Economist Bill Mitchell (2010) notes how in 2002 the Australian experience may have 
‘given the game away’ in regards to ruling class sentiments about the public debt. That year 
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in periods of confidence is lukewarm, then how seriously should we take its calls for 
debt reduction in a period of global crisis? How can we treat the current calls for 
debt reduction as anything but fear mongering that serves some ulterior motive?  
 
Of course there is nothing particularly novel in suggesting that the ‘Fix the Debt’ 
campaign is mostly a ploy to broaden support for an austerity agenda. This 
argument has been made not only by Occupy-inspired the ‘Flip the Debt’ movement 
but also by mainstream economists such as Paul Krugman (2012b, 2013).  
 
What is novel about the approach taken here is that it moves beyond the narrow 
debate over the ‘debt dilemma’ and looks at the power underpinnings of the public 
debt through an examination of the top percentile’s share of federal bonds and 
interest income. By mapping the distributive shares of the public debt we come to a 
more nuanced understanding of the complex ways in which the ruling class wields 
power through the institution of public debt. And it is only by mapping these 
distributive shares that we come to understand the limits, contradictions and 
dilemmas that emerge out of the power relations of public indebtedness.   
 
Rather than debate with the top 1% on its own terms, those that oppose the 
austerity agenda would do well to think seriously about these power relations and 
articulate an alternative view of America’s ‘debt dilemma’.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Australian government was running massive and growing budget surpluses yet 
continued to issue significant sums of government bonds. The reason? Powerful financial 
institutions started to protest against the ‘thinning’ of the bond market.  
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